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If economic agents coordinate on social norms more oriented
towards the protection of national industries, an asymmetric in-
ternational specialization in the research and development (R&D)
arises even in a tari⁄free world with no a priori di⁄erences across
countries in endowments, demography or technology.
This paper exploits the indi⁄erence in the composition of R&D
expenditure across sectors of the typical multi-sector Schumpeterian
framework (forward-looking decisions, CRS R&D technology and
free entry) to construct a theory of the international allocation of
innovation and education based on sunspot equilibrium. A role
for industrial policies as mere coordination devices emerges in an
international Schumpeterian framework. The implications for the
relationships between inequality and growth are examined.
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21 Introduction
Can social norms determine the international division of innovative labor?
Why are some countries innovating in more sectors than other countries, after
controlling for market fundamentals? For example the US and Continental
Europe are two regions of the world that have similar potentialities for re-
search and development (R&D) and comparably e¢ cient education systems1.
Yet the US economy is active in a larger number of technological sectors -
most notably information and communication technologies, and biotechnol-
ogy2 - have a larger percentage of educated workers as well as higher wage
inequality, and innovate relatively more in the aggregate. Using standard
Schumpeterian theory this paper claims that these features may partly be
a consequence of the coordination of US investors on a social norm more
oriented towards the defense of the national interest in a larger number of
industries than economic actors in Europe.
Historical and geographical explanations may be given to argue that na-
tional cohesion has been more strictly enforced in the US than in a similarly
sized subcontinent such as Europe. This paper shows that such behavior
1OCDE surveys (e.g. PISA 2000) on the performances in maths, science and languages
of students under 15 years of age in Europe and in the USA shows no signi￿cant di⁄erence
(a slightly higher mean in Europe with more dispersion).
2￿ The sector distribution of U.S. industrial R&D performance is among the most wide-
spread and diverse among OECD members.... United States have...become globally com-
petitive in numerous industries rather than just a few industries or niche technologies. In
2000 no U.S. industrial sector accounted for more than the 13 percent of total industrial
R&D concentrated in the electronic equipment manufacturing sector. In comparison, most
of the other countries displayed somewhat higher sector concentrations. For example, 20
percent or more of industrial R&D was concentrated in electronic equipment manufactur-
ing in Finland (at 49 percent of its industry total), South Korea (37 percent), Canada (29
percent), and Sweden (23 percent). Indeed, the electronic equipment sector was among
the largest performers of industrial R&D in 7 of the 11 countries shown and was the second
largest performer of industrial R&D for the entire European Union. Among other manu-
facturing sectors, motor vehicles in Germany and pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom
accounted for 20 percent or more of total R&D performance, which was consistent with
general economic production patterns...One of the more signi￿cant trends in both U.S. and
international industrial R&D activity has been the growth of R&D in the service (non-
manufacturing) sector. According to the internationally harmonized data in table 4-20 ,
this sector accounted for 34 percent of total industrial R&D performance in the United
States in 2000￿ . (National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2004, Ch.
4, available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind04/c4/c4s4.htm).
3does not violate the assumptions of individual rationality.
It is common in new trade theory to predict perfectly symmetric long run
outcomes for countries that share the same demographic structures, same
preferences, same technologies, and same institutional features. Factor price
equalization (FPE) and identical performance are typically predicted by the
Schumpeterian theory of trade and growth (see e.g. Grossman and Help-
man 1991 ch.7, and Aghion and Howitt 1998 ch.10). The seminal paper
by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) - that extends to international eco-
nomics two important theories of technological evolution that rule out the
￿ strong scale e⁄ect￿(Jones 2003) which ￿ awed the early generation growth
and trade models - is no exception in this respect. I show here that in the
same framework otherwise identical countries with no trade impediments
could coordinate on each of at least a continuum of di⁄erent equilibria, with
only one delivering the celebrated symmetric outcome. Indeterminacy can-
not be ruled out by a concentration on the steady state analysis, because of
the existence a continuum of steady states. I argue that, far from being a
problem for the explanatory ability of Schumpeterian theory, indeterminacy
enriches its possibility of incorporating interesting social norms.
This multiplicity of equilibria is due to the forward looking nature of the
Schumpeterian ￿ creative destruction￿ mechanism formalized in the single
country-single industry path breaking Aghion and Howitt (1992). Private
￿rms undertake R&D activities aimed at developing better versions of an
already existing product because the winner of the patent race will enjoy
monopoly pro￿ts; but such pro￿ts are temporary because new R&D ￿rms
are always trying to make the monopolist￿ s product obsolete. Hence the
expectation of more R&D in the future discourages current R&D. Similarly
to the overlapping generations models with money, indeterminacy can emerge
because there is no way to force yet unfounded future ￿rms to a particular
path of R&D investment, and depending on the di⁄erent expectations about
the future levels of R&D current R&D investment may di⁄er.
While in Aghion and Howitt￿ s (1992) economy indeterminacy was con-
￿ned to non-stationary equilibria with the interior steady state being locally
unique, our multisector economy admits indeterminacy of stationary equi-
libria, each of them thereby qualifying as a stationary rational expectations
equilibrium. In any of the asymmetric equilibria we will study the di⁄erent
countries specialize endogenously in the R&D of a subset of the existing con-
sumer goods. However such specialization is not the result of exogenously
given resource or technology endowments, but of the self-ful￿lling expecta-
4tion of a ￿ punishment￿against the ￿rm that deviates from such behavior: if
a country A ￿rm invades one of country B￿ s monopolized sectors country B￿ s
research units will try to regain monopoly in that market by investing more in
R&D. The above mentioned behavior is perfectly rational and requires only
a one period expected ￿ punishment￿of deviators. The main consequence is
that in the continuum of asymmetric steady states we will construct coun-
tries di⁄er in the range of goods in which they undertake R&D and dominate
production worldwide. The logic of my argument goes as follows:
1. The reward to innovation in a given industry depends negatively on
expected future innovation in the industry: future innovations render current
innovations obsolete.
2. Expectations about future R&D is conditional on the nationality of
the next innovator. A public signal can coordinate atomless national R&D
investors to an aggregate behavior that ends up ￿punishing￿the foreign R&D
￿rms innovate in a subset of industries.
3. In equilibrium these punishments are credible, and a country can cap-
ture a disproportionate part of the innovative sectors. This raises the demand
for skilled workers, increases the wage premium and therefore inequality.
Our ￿ discriminatory equilibria￿are an admittedly highly abstract metaphors
susceptible to real world interpretations. In particular, they capture all the
cases in which a country￿ s authorities, media, and trade organizations are
concerned with defending their country￿ s international competitiveness in
some sectors in which they traditionally held primacy. When a high tech-
nology sector is threatened by foreign competition it is not uncommon to
see private and public economic forces mobilize and try to defend it. Does
such mobilization violate the logic of perfectly competing R&D and ￿nancial
markets in general equilibrium? This paper proves that it need not be so.
In fact, what industrial associations, government agencies, mass media, etc.
may be doing is to give a public signal that trigger a R&D over-investment
by multitude of private economic agents. Hence they are playing the role
of a ￿ sunspot￿(Farmer 1998) incarnated by the monitoring of the publicly
visible untouched industrial excellence in a range of sectors3. A di⁄erent ex-
3A striking example is Japanese MITI￿ s "Visions" in shaping national R&D by co-
ordinating the expectations of the business community. According to Watanabi (2004),
￿ Japans ratio of governmental R&D support to overall industry R&D investment is just
3% (1997). This ratio is extremely small compared to 15% in the USA (1998), 24% in
Germany (1997), 13% in France (1995) and 10% in the UK (1997). This observation im-
plies the ability of Japans R&D policy system to e⁄ectively stimulate industry R&D with
5pected reaction by the private R&D investors to a public complaint about a
sector￿ s lost primacy is part of a di⁄erent sunspot equilibrium. The existence
of sunspot equilibria found in this class of models implies that the industrial
policies of nations can play the role of natural coordination devices of large
volumes of private resources, with dramatic international consequences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
derives the main results and discusses their sunspot equilibrium interpreta-
tion. Section 4 explains the intuitions for the macroeconomic consequences
of the asymmetric steady states. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Assume a two country world, in which population, preferences, technologies,
and institutions are identical in both countries A and B. Time is contin-
uous and unbounded and expectations are rational. There are no tari⁄s,
there is perfect mobility of goods, capital, ideas, and technology, but there
is international immobility of labor.
only limited ￿nancial resources. Despite a limited ￿nancial role, MITI (Japans Ministry
of International Trade & Industry), which is responsible for industrial technology policy,
has developed other governance systems which permit it to play a leading role in the
stimulation of industry R&D...A report on science and governing issues published in 1963
by the advisory council to the Minister of MITI became Japans ￿rst so-called ￿ Vision￿ ,
and in response, MITI established the Large-Scale R&D Project in 1966. This programme
focused on strategic R&D initiated by R&D consortia run on government initiative, and
laid the groundwork for MITI￿ s long-lasting national R&D programme.
It is clear that MITIs ￿ Visions￿programme in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s played an
important role in shaping the respective decades. In this policy system, the ￿ Visions￿
concept played a fundamental role. This approach provided a vehicle for synchronizing
possible, expected and preferred futures by perceiving future directions, identifying long-
term goals, creating consensus, instilling con￿dence, and establishing the respective sharing
of responsibilities among the broad sectors concerned. In Japan, this approach proved to
be a vehicle for e⁄ective governance by creating the conditions for a virtuous cycle in which
technological progress and socio-economic development reinforced one another.￿
￿ Visions￿in Co-Evolution: A Japanese Perspective on Science and Governance￿ , Chi-
hiro Watanabi, IPTS Report 2004.
6As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) within each country the house-
holds di⁄er in the ability - uniformly distributed over the unit interval - of
their individual members to become skilled workers, while all individuals
have identical intertemporally additively separable and unit elastic prefer-
ences for an in￿nite set of consumption goods indexed by ! 2 [0;1], and are
endowed with a unit of labor/study time endowment whose supply entails
no disutility. Dropping country indexes for notational simplicity, we assume
that households choose their optimal consumption bundle for each date by



































t (r(￿)￿n)d￿c￿(s)ds, for all t ￿ 0,
where N0 is the initial population in both countries and n is its common
growth rate, ￿ is the common rate of time preference - with ￿ > n - and
r(s) is the market interest rate. q￿(j;!;s) is ability ￿ 2 [0;1] household￿ s
per-member consumption ￿ ow of quality j 2 f0;1;2;:::g of good ! 2 [0;1] at
time s ￿ 0 - p(j;!;s) being the price of good ! of quality j at time s - c￿(s) is
nominal individual expenditure, W￿(t) and Z￿(t) are human and non-human
wealth levels. A new vintage of a good delivers ￿ > 1 more quality services
than its previous version. Di⁄erent versions of the same good ! are regarded
by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality ratios,
and jmax(!;s) denotes the time s top quality of good !. As is common in
quality ladders models I will assume price competition4 at all dates, with the
4Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) assume quantity competition instead of price com-
petition. In this paper I prefer to follow the traditional Bertrand competition assumption
because of its notational simplicity: however all qualitative results would hold under quan-
tity competition.
7implication that in equilibrium only the top quality product will be produced
and consumed in positive amounts.
Individuals are ￿nitely lived members of in￿nitely lived households, being
continuously born at rate ￿, and dying at rate ￿, with ￿ ￿ ￿ = n > 0;
D > 0 denotes the exogenously given duration of their life5. Demographics
is identical in each country. People are altruistic in that they care about
their household￿ s total discounted utility according to the intertemporally
additive functional shown in (1). They choose to train and become skilled
at the beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their training
period - in which the individual cannot work - is exogenously ￿xed at T < D.













t r(￿)d￿ max(￿ ￿ ￿;0)wH(s)ds,
with 0 < ￿ < 1=2. Notice that an individual of ability ￿ > ￿ is postulated
able to accumulate skill (human capital) ￿￿￿ after training, while individuals
with too low ability (￿ < ￿) never get any skill from schooling.
As Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) I will focus on the steady state
(balanced growth) analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rates and
wL, wH, and c￿ are all constant. It easily follows that r(s) = ￿ at all dates,















We will prove later that in our economy factor price equalization (FPE) does
not generically hold, and hence we have to label wages for the country where
the corresponding labor is hired. The supply of unskilled labor in country
















Notice that NA(t) = NB(t) ￿ N(t) by assumption.
5As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999: 454) it is easy to show that the above parame-
ters cannot be chosen independently, but that they must satisfy ￿ = n
enD￿1 and ￿ = ne
nD
enD￿1
in order for the number of births at time t to match the number of deaths at t + D.
8Following the same steps as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999: 456) the
reader can easily verify that the supply of skilled labor in country k = A;B













with 0 < ￿ < 1. Clearly in any steady state the growth rate of LA(t), LB(t),
HA(t), and HB(t) is equal to n.
2.2 Manufacture
In each country ￿rms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consump-
tion good ! 2 [0;1] of the second best quality under a constant returns to
scale (CRS) technology described by the simple unit cost function awA
L for
country A and awB
L for country B, with a > 0 common in all industries.
However in each industry the top quality product can be manufactured only
by the ￿rm that has discovered it - whose rights are protected by a patent -
in the whole world. This assumption allows for multinational companies es-
tablishing subsidiaries in low wage countries to carry out the manufacturing
of their leading-edge products: hence in equilibrium unskilled labor prices
will equalize, and we will chose it as numeraire, that is: wA
L = wB
L = 1.
As usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Gross-
man and Helpman 1991 and Aghion and Howitt 1998) the next quality of a
given good is invented by the R&D performed by challenger ￿rms in order to
earn monopoly pro￿ts that will be destroyed by the next innovator. During
each temporary monopoly the patent holder can sell the product worldwide
at prices higher than the unit cost. As Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999)
we assume that the patent expires when further innovation occurs in the in-
dustry. Hence the monopolist rents are destroyed not only by obsolescence
but also because a competitive fringe can copy the product using the same
CRS technology.
The unit elastic demand structure6 encourages the monopolist to set the
highest possible price to maximize pro￿ts, but the existence of a competitive
fringe worldwide sets a ceiling to it equal to the world lowest unit cost of
6Any CES utility index with elasticity of substitution not greater than one would imply
this result. Were the elasticity of substitution greater than one, if the quality jump ￿ were
high enough, we could have drastic innovations, with unconstrained pro￿t maximizing
top quality produceres that wipe out sales of the second best quality consumption good
(produced by unskilled workers). Our asymmetric specialization results would not change
in any meaningful way.
9the previous quality product. This allows us to conclude that the price
p(jmax(!;s);!;s) of every top quality good is:
p(j
max(!;s);!;s) = ￿a, for all ! 2 [0;1] and s ￿ 0. (5)
From the assumed household￿ s preference structures, we can immediately
conclude that each consumer ￿ in country K = A, B will buy quantity
cK















and in equilibrium this will coincide with the production of every consump-
tion good by the ￿rm that monopolizes it.
It follows that the stream of monopoly pro￿ts accruing to the monopolist
which produces a state-of-the-art quality product in country K = A;B will
be equal to:
￿












Hence a ￿rm that produces good ! in country K = A;B has an expected

















where I(!;s) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation
that will destroy the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts in industry !.
In a steady state where per-capita variables all grow at a constant rate,













￿ + I(!;s) ￿ n
(8)
K = A;B. In what follows it is important to notice that within each country
￿rms in all industries have the same value if and only if obsolescence - i.e.
their corresponding value for I(!;s) - is the same. In the event7 obsolescence
is identical across countries as well, ￿rms will have the same stock market
value.
7Which, as we shall see, corresponds to the steady state in the so called ￿ TEG￿speci-
￿cation of the research technology.
102.3 R&D Races
In each industry the world leaders are challenged by the R&D ￿rms that
employ skilled workers and produce a probability intensity of inventing the
next version of their products. The arrival rate of innovation in industry
! at time s is I(!;s) ￿ IA(!;s) + IB(!;s), and it is the world aggregate
summation of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D
￿rms targeting product !.
Every R&D ￿rm can produce a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the
product line it targets by use of a CRS technology characterized by unit cost
function bwA
HX(!;s) in country A and bwB
HX(!;s) in country B, with b > 0
common in all industries and X(!;s) > 0 measuring the degree of complex-
ity in the invention of the next quality product in industry !. Hence R&D
is formally equivalent to buying a lottery ticket that confers to its owner the
exclusive right to the corresponding innovation pro￿ts, with the aggregate
rate of innovation proportional to the ￿ number of tickets￿purchased. The
Poisson speci￿cation of the innovative process implies that the individual
contribution to R&D by each skilled labor unit gives an independent (addi-
tive) contribution to the worldwide instantaneous probability of innovation:
hence R&D productivity is the same if each research worker undertakes R&D
by self-employing herself as if they are co-working in large ￿rms. In this pa-
per we will work under the assumption that regardless of the ￿rm sizes the
nationality of the labor unit responsible for a successful innovation is public
information.
The technological complexity index X(!;s) has been introduced into en-
dogenous growth theory after Charles Jones￿(1995) empirical criticism of
R&D based growth models generating scale e⁄ects in the steady state per-
capita growth rate, and it is standard to assign it two alternative laws of
motion. According to Segerstrom￿ s (1998) interpretation of Jones￿(1995)
solution to the ￿ strong scale e⁄ect￿problem (Jones 2003), it is increasing in





with positive ￿, thus formalizing the idea that early discoveries ￿sh out the
easier inventions ￿rst, leaving the most di¢ cult ones for the future.





with positive k, thereby formalizing the idea that it is more di¢ cult to in-
troduce a new product in a more crowded market.
Both formulations, as well as similar others rule out implausible ￿ scale
e⁄ects￿ , but they have di⁄erent long run implications: the ￿rst one - TEG8
- implies that more and more di¢ cult inventions will eventually make per-
capita GDP growth vanish over time unless more and more resources are in-
vested in R&D, thereby requiring a growing educated population; instead the
PEG9 formulation allows for sustained growth without population growth.
In the present framework with quality improving consumer goods ￿ growth￿
is interpreted as the increase over time of the representative consumer utility
level.
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) carry out their analysis for both spec-
i￿cations of the di¢ culty index, and so will this paper do.
For industries targeted by positive R&D in each country K = A;B the





HX(!;s) for all ! 2 [0;1] and s ￿ 0. (9)
3 Self-Ful￿lling World Disparities
3.1 Asymmetric R&D Races
From (8) and (9) follows that not all industries ! 2 [0;1] will necessarily be
targeted by R&D in country A. In fact assume that there exists a proper non-
zero measure subset of industries ￿B ￿ [0;1] such that all ￿rms expect that
after an R&D ￿rm in A discovers the next version of a product ! 2 ￿B more
R&D will be undertaken worldwide in industry ! than in the other industries
8Acronym ￿ TEG￿refers to the ￿ temporary e⁄ects on growth￿of policy measures such
as R&D subsidies and tari⁄s: they cannot alter the steady state percapita growth rate,
which is instead pinned down by the population growth rate, the negative dynamic exter-
nality parameter ￿, and the number of countries where R&D is active.
9Acronym ￿ PEG￿refers to the ￿ permanent e⁄ects on growth￿of policy measures such
as R&D subsidies and tari⁄s: they can alter the steady state percapita growth rate.
12!0 2 [0;1]￿￿B, assumed of (however small but) positive measure. It follows
that no country A R&D ￿rm will ever target product ! 2 ￿B, because they
expect that after the next quality jump obsolescence will be higher than for
product !0 2 [0;1] ￿ ￿B, thus generating the same ￿ ow of pro￿ts (7) for a
shorter expected time. By applying the same logic to country B R&D ￿rms
targeting products ! 2 ￿A = [0;1] ￿ ￿B, we can partition the unit interval
into two nonzero-measure subsets ￿A [￿B = [0;1], ￿A \￿B = ;, such that all
indexes ! 2 ￿A correspond to industries in which only R&D ￿rms in country
A are active, while all indexes ! 2 ￿B correspond to industries in which only
R&D ￿rms in country B are active. As a consequence in the long run each
country will maintain leadership in its corresponding set of industries. In
what follows labels are such that m(￿A) ￿ 1=2 ￿ m(￿B). Propositions 1 and
2 will show that in any steady state the more diversi￿ed country has higher
skilled labor wage.
The above beliefs can be part of an equilibrium because (9) impose indif-
ference across sectors where positive R&D is undertaken, and since the CRS
R&D technology leaves indeterminate the composition of the R&D e⁄orts
across the active sectors in each country, it allows the market participants to
coordinate on any belief about it provided that after the subsequent quality
jump the symmetric allocation is recovered. This is a building block of the
new kind of sunspot equilibria used in this paper, which is formally proved
in Section 3.5.
In real life terms, the beliefs sustaining such a discriminatory equilibrium
involve an expected backlash by R&D ￿rms in country B motivated by the
will to regain a lost leadership. According to this interpretation, after losing
the leading edge in a sector previously dominated by country B the R&D
￿rms of this country will hire in that sector more di¢ culty index-adjusted
R&D labor than hired by country A￿ s ￿rms in each sector ! 2 ￿A: the expec-
tation of this reaction dissuades country A￿ s ￿rms from undertaking R&D in
that sector and drives to zero the probability of conquering leadership. At
the same time, the expectation that from the next quality jump the status
quo will be re-established anywhere renders the country B￿ s ￿rms indi⁄er-
ent - from a pecuniary point of view - between investing in that sector and
investing in all the other ￿B￿ s product lines, thereby justifying the higher
investment in the sector by extrinsic factors. The precise R&D investment
levels that justify these equilibria are explicitly obtained analytically in Sec-
tions 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
Notice that the kind of leadership we are analyzing is due to entirely
13strategic reasons and that, moreover, these strategies are not set by individ-
ual monopolists, because free entry and CRS would annihilate their dissua-
sion power. Such strategies are ￿ sunspot￿strategies, that is a coordination
of large numbers of entrant R&D ￿rms on a stochastically generated public
signal that triggers their aggregate response. Hence in this paper we will see
how ￿ sunspots matter￿(Cass and Shell 1983) in a standard Schumpeterian
international economy. The multitude of private R&D ￿rms and their ￿-
nanciers will accept to follow the public signal to defend the threatened
competitiveness of a sector because - due to the R&D arbitrage conditions -
it costs nothing to them. Hence the arbitrage condition and constant returns
by implying indeterminate R&D sector sizes leaves room for the emergence
of a richer set of real world features.
We will work under the assumption that in the active sectors within each
country R&D intensity and arrival rates are identical and we will assume
identical initial conditions. Therefore
I(!;s) = I
K(!;s) + 0 ￿ I
K, ! 2 ￿K, K = A;B.
Similarly we will label complexity measures as follows:
X(!;s) ￿ X
K, ! 2 ￿K, K = A;B,
where the reader must keep in mind that both in TEG and in PEG speci-
￿cations complexity regards technology worldwide, and therefore the above
superscript K = A;B only indicates that the corresponding good is currently
being produced and targeted by R&D ￿rms located in the corresponding
country, though there is no technological necessity for this. Also, I have
dropped time indexes s for notational convenience.
3.1.1 The ￿ Partition￿of the Product Space is Not Necessary
It is worthwhile to emphasize that though in the rest of the paper we will
analyze only the benchmark case in which the two subsets of industries in
which the two countries undertake R&D do not overlap, cases with ￿A \
￿B 6= ; and/or ￿A [ ￿B 6= [0;1] can be analyzed formally along similar lines.
This is easily seen in the PEG case10. In such cases, the beliefs sustaining
the asymmetric steady states should be amended in the following way: for
10Similar results hold for the TEG case, but the full derivation is more cumbersome.
14every product ! 2 ￿A \ ￿B 6= ; the ￿rms expect that after a country A
R&D ￿rm￿ s success in discovering its next version worldwide R&D investment
will be IA(!;s) + IB(!;s) = IA(!0;s), !0 2 ￿A ￿ f￿A \ ￿Bg, whereas they
expect that after a country B R&D ￿rm￿ s success in discovering its next
version worldwide R&D investment will be IA(!;s) + IB(!;s) = IB(!0;s),
!0 2 ￿B ￿ f￿A \ ￿Bg. These R&D investment levels would be observed with
probability one along the equilibrium path. The o⁄-equilibrium punishments
for country B ￿rms investing in !0 2 ￿A ￿ f￿A \ ￿Bg and country A ￿rms
investing in !0 2 ￿B￿f￿A\￿Bg are characterized by the same features as the
punishment strategies we will describe for the case of a partition. Of course
these punishment actions are never observed in equilibrium.
Instead for every product ! 2 [0;1] ￿ f￿A [ ￿Bg 6= ; the ￿rms expect
that after any R&D ￿rm￿ s success in discovering its next version worldwide
R&D investment will become IA(!;s)+IB(!;s) > maxfIA(!0;s);IB(!0;s)g,
!0 2 ￿A [ ￿B. This condition states that in sectors that do not belong to
￿A[￿B no R&D ￿rm would ever ￿nd it convenient to invest, regardless of its
nationality. In fact, in case one ￿rm succeeds in inventing a better version of
a good !0 2 [0;1] ￿ f￿A [ ￿Bg, there would be a ￿ ood of follower innovators
for a (stochastically long) period. However, at the end of that period, sector
!0 will becomes an inactive sector.
3.2 Asymmetric Balanced Growth Paths
Let us remind that in this hypothetical world economy there is perfect in-
ternational mobility of goods and capital, perfect mobility of manufacturing
methods and perfect spillover of ideas, but international immobility of la-
bor. Moreover, we do not assume di⁄erent R&D technologies despite the
fact that our behavioral assumption of non-overlapping and exhaustive ac-
tive R&D industries makes the results observational equivalent to a case of
international specialization of R&D technologies. However, for the reader
who feels more comfortable with an interpretation of international special-
ization in terms of more ￿ fundamental￿ factors rather than ￿ self-ful￿lling
prophecies￿ , it is worthwhile to remark that the derivations here and in Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 maintain their validity under the alternative assumption
that country K = A;B ￿rms have an exogenously given relative competitive
advantage in the R&D of products ! 2 ￿K.
We are now in a position to analyze the general equilibrium implications
of the previous setting. As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) we will
15focus on the steady state properties of the model.
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Recall that each ￿nal good monopolist employs unskilled labor worldwide to
manufacture the same amount of each commodity to sell worldwide. There-
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where xK ￿ XK
N denotes the population-adjusted degrees of complexity for
products produced in country K = A;B.













where m(￿K) denotes the measure of industries where country K does
R&D.
3.3 Steady State Properties of the TEG Speci￿cation
In this section we will adopt the TEG speci￿cation of technological evolution
and leave the analysis of the PEG speci￿cation to the next section.




n. Hence (TEG) implies: IA = IB = n=￿. As usual in growth models with
increasing complexity the steady state arrival rate of innovation in every in-
dustry is a linear increasing function of the population growth rate. Hence,
























Km(￿K)n=￿, K = A;B. (15)
16Proposition 1 Under the TEG speci￿cation, if ￿ 2 (0;:5) a steady state
exists for every m(￿A) 2 [1=2;1). At each steady state in which m(￿A) 2








b. xA < xB and xAm(￿A) > xBm(￿B).
c. Country A￿ s innovation rate - IAm(￿A) - is higher than country B￿ s
innovation rate - IBm(￿B).
d. The world growth rate is invariant.
e. The world level of human capital is lower in any asymmetric steady
state than in any symmetric steady state.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The economic reasons for our results can be described. Country A￿ s R&D
specializes in a larger number of sectors than country B￿ s R&D: therefore
in country A human capital would be diluted in a wider range of sectors,
￿A, than in country B. This induces a lower probability of innovation per
unit time in each country A￿ s sector - i.e. lower per-sector expected obso-
lescence - which, in the TEG case, implies a slower evolution of the R&D
complexity indexes in such sectors. Since pro￿ts are equal worldwide, due to
the presence of multinational manufacturing ￿rms and consumer preferences
symmetric across varieties, and interest rates are equalized in the global cap-
ital market, the stock market value of each country A ￿rm is higher than the
value of each country B ￿rm. As a consequence, perfect competition in the
R&D sectors in both countries requires a higher skilled/unskilled wage ratio
in country A than in country B, in order to annihilate expected R&D pro￿ts.
In turn, the higher skill premium in country A would induce a higher propor-
tion of the population to get skilled, because educational choices respond to
the relative wage incentives. The higher human capital in country A however
does not su¢ ce to equalize the skill premium worldwide, because individual
educational abilities di⁄er, and the additional students are less and less able
to accumulate human capital. The assumed heterogeneous learning abilities
imply that asymmetric equilibrium unequal cross-country labor force educa-
tion attainments are ine¢ cient from a worldwide perspective: since country
A￿ s marginal student is less able to accumulate human capital than country
B￿ s marginal student, the worldwide human capital level would increase fol-
lowing a hypothetical marginal decrease education in country A in exchange
for an equal marginal increase in education in country B, while leaving the
worldwide manufacturing production una⁄ected. Of course, more human
17capital worldwide translate into more steady state innovation rates (in the
PEG case) and population-adjusted technological levels (in the TEG case).
3.4 Steady State Properties of the PEG Speci￿cation
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the consequences of the PEG
speci￿cation of technology. From eq. (PEG) it obviously follows that in
both countries and for all industries the population-adjusted di¢ culty index

































K, K = A;B. (17)
Then we derive:
Proposition 2 Under the PEG speci￿cation, for all parameter values such
that
bk￿ (￿ ￿ n)
2(￿ ￿ 1)
< 1 ￿ ￿
2
a steady state exists for every m(￿A) 2 [1=2;1). At each steady state in which








b. IA < IB and IAm(￿A) > IBm(￿B).
c. The world innovation rate is lower in any asymmetric steady state
than in any symmetric steady state.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Remark. In the PEG speci￿cation the international division of innovative
- and correspondingly non-innovative as well - labor is cause of inequality
both within and between countries and of ine¢ cient growth of everybody￿ s
utility. Such international division of labor can be self-ful￿lling in our model,
but the same consequences would apply if it was exogenously generated.
At the heart of this ine¢ ciency result is the endogenous skill formation by
rational individuals with heterogeneous abilities.
18Like in the previous section, the economic reasons for our results can be
described. Country A￿ s R&D specializes in a larger number of sectors than
country B￿ s R&D: therefore in country A human capital would be diluted
in a wider range of sectors, ￿A, than in country B. This induces a lower
probability of innovation per unit time in each country A￿ s sector, that is
a lower expected obsolescence of countryA monopolies. Since pro￿ts are
equal worldwide, due to the presence of multinational manufacturing ￿rms
and symmetric consumer preferences, and interest rates are equalized in the
global capital market, the stock market value of each country A ￿rm is higher
than the value of each country B ￿rm. As a consequence, perfect competition
in the R&D sectors in both countries requires a higher skilled/unskilled wage
ratio in country A than in country B, in order to annihilate expected R&D
pro￿ts. In turn, the higher skill premium in country A would induce a
higher proportion of the population to get skilled, because educational choices
respond to the relative wage incentives. The higher aggregate human capital
in country A implies, in the PEG speci￿cation, a more intense aggregate ￿ ow
of innovations in country A than in country B. However, it does not su¢ ce to
equalize the skill premium worldwide, because individual educational abilities
di⁄er, and the additional students are less able to accumulate human capital.
As in the TEG case, the assumed heterogeneous learning abilities imply
that unequal cross-country labor force education attainments are ine¢ cient:
since country A￿ s marginal student is less able to accumulate human capital
than country B￿ s marginal student, the worldwide human capital level would
increase following a hypothetical a marginal decrease education in country A
in exchange for an equal marginal increase in education in country B, while
leaving the worldwide manufacturing production una⁄ected.
3.5 O⁄ Equilibrium Paths
There are two likely problems that we have to solve. The ￿rst one is that
the equilibria the we focus on (asymmetric outcomes for symmetric coun-
tries) need to survive the further requirement that out-of-equilibrium beliefs
be credible. What are the individually rational incentives for negligible do-
mestic investors to punish the foreign innovators who challenge the national
industries? The second problem is that a full treatment of the problem can-
not be done by assuming that the economy is in the steady state. Some of
the deviations from equilibrium considered are likely to put the economy in
19the transition towards a new steady state.
In this section we will explicit o⁄ equilibrium path strategies in a way
that rationalizes each element of the previous set of asymmetric equilibria.
Let us remind that the value of a monopolist ￿rm is:
￿












Hence a ￿rm that produces good ! in country K = A;B has an expected























Along the equilibrium path no country A ￿rm will ever challenge the
incumbent of a product ! 2 ￿B and viceversa.
However, should at time t0 ￿ 0 a country A R&D ￿rm decide to be
active in a sector ! 2 ￿B, in the hypothetical history after its success in
discovering a better quality j(!;t0)+1 and in displacing the former country B
monopolist producing quality j(!;t0), sector ! would be targeted by punisher
country B R&D ￿rms. Punisher country B ￿rms￿supernormal investment
- which we will compute shortly for both TEG and PEG cases - entails11
If(!;t) > IA(!0;t), !0 2 ￿A, would only last during the ￿ punishment phase￿ ,
i.e. until quality j(!;t0) + 2 is discovered, after which R&D investment in
sector ! would become equal to all the remaining sectors in ￿B.
I construct If(!;t) such that during the ￿ punishment phase￿ , that is
for all t 2 R+ : j(!;t) = j(!;t0) + 1,
the value of the patent
vf(!;t) =
￿N(s)





satis￿es the following equality:
vf(!;t) = bw
A
HX(!;t)(1 ￿ ￿) < bw
A
HX(!;t), (20)
11To facilitate the reader, we will be using the f deponent to denote the values of
the ￿rm and of obsolescence (by convention, not of the di¢ culty index) expected during
the punishment phase of the game between the would-be challenger and the other future
potential outsider R&D ￿rms.
20with12 ￿ 2]0;1[.
It is interesting to see that now we departed from Dinopoulos and Segerstrom￿ s
(1999) restriction on the agent￿ s expectation of smooth time pro￿les for the
stock market values of the top quality ￿rms in each sector. According to
(20), potential R&D investors from country A expect that if one them suc-
ceeds in developing the next version of good ! 2 ￿B, the value of the idea
patented by the new quality leader will be strictly lower than its research
and development cost. For this reason R&D ￿rms will not ￿nd it convenient
to invest in that sector.
Interestingly, given the generality of the possible ￿s, we are characterizing
a continuum of o⁄equilibrium strategies whose expectation is consistent with
the previously described equilibrium strategies.
In what follows it is important to note that we are only considering de-
viations from equilibrium in one sector, !. To ￿x the ideas we will focus on
! 2 ￿B, but the symmetric case ! 2 ￿A can be treated along the same lines.
3.5.1 The TEG Case
In this section we will consider o⁄-equilibrium one-sector deviations from the
steady state equilibrium, with resulting punishment that lasts until the next
quality jump in that sector. It is important to notice that punishment, by
implying a super-normal R&D investment in a sector, will force that sector
out of the steady state. This renders an explicit study of the transitional
dynamics around the steady state necessary. Fortunately, since each sector
is zero measure, the one-sector deviation from the equilibrium by leaving all
the aggregate variables unaltered, will not change the rest of the economy,
which will keeps following a balanced growth path. However, by driving the
sectorial R&D di¢ culty index at a faster speed, will cast that sector out of
12As the reader will note, what we are assuming here is more than enough for subgame
perfection, that would just require inequality (20) to hold only at one instant, i.e. at
t = tF, with
tF ￿ minft 2 R+ : j(!;t) = j(!;t0) + 1g .
However, (20) allows a neat analytical expression of a possible set of o⁄-equilibrium strate-
gies which render our asymmetric steady state equilibria subgame perfect. Morever, in the
TEG case this will allow a precise study of the transitional dynamics of the o⁄-equilibrium
sector di¢ culty index.











￿ + If(!;t)(1 ￿ ￿)
= (1 ￿ ￿)bw
A
HX(!;t). (22)
From now on we will assume ￿ 2]0;1[.











Therefore eq. (23) gives at all dates the value of country B punishers￿invest-
ment su¢ cient to dissuade the entry in sector ! by country A R&D ￿rms. I
will prove next that this threat will in turn be credible.





















(￿ ￿ n)￿ + n
1 ￿ ￿
x(!;t). (24)
Since ￿ > n by assumption, this law of motion of the population-adjusted
di¢ culty index of the sector that unilaterally deviated from the equilibrium




H [(￿ ￿ n)￿ + n]
,
which is a ￿nite value above the steady state value, xA, of population adjusted
di¢ culty indexes.
Given R&D investment (23), the corresponding Poisson process implies
that with probability one, at some ￿nite date a new quality jump will occur
that will be appropriated by country B￿ s R&D ￿rms. In order for punishers￿
22R&D investment If(!;t) given by (23) to be part of a best response by coun-
try B R&D ￿rms, each country B R&D investor shall not expect additional
gains or losses from investing in sector !, that is the usual R&D arbitrage
condition must hold for the further future R&D activity. Hence:
v(!;t) =
￿N(t)




for all t 2 R+ : j(!;t) ￿ j(!;t0) + 2.
This in turn implies a requirement on the expected future value of I(!;t)
after the following quality jump13 in sector !. Consistently, we set:
































(￿ ￿ n)￿ + n
1 ￿ ￿
x(!;t). (27)
Since ￿ > n by assumption, after the end of the - previous - ￿ punishment
phase￿ , the deviated sector returns an ordinary ￿B sector, and this law of mo-
tion of the population-adjusted di¢ culty index of the sector that unilaterally





H [(￿ ￿ n)￿ + n]
.
To sum up, this section has shown that the asymmetric equilibria previ-
ously described do not entail any deviation from agent optimizing behavior
in their actions and in their beliefs. Moreover, even for o⁄-equilibrium uni-
lateral deviations from the steady state, the implied transitional dynamics
has been treated.
13Notice that I have now dropped deponent f, to denote the obsolescence expected for
dates after the end of the punishment phase.
233.5.2 The PEG Case
In this case, eq. (PEG) dictates X(!;t) ￿ k
2N(t). Therefore the evolution
of the di¢ culty index is independent from the system being in the steady
state. However, even evaluating hypothetical deviations from the equilibrium
of our game from a steady state standpoint, the resulting o⁄-equilibrium
punishment in any given sector implies that in the sector the ￿ ow of R&D
investment - and the resulting probability intensity of the Poisson process for
innovation - will di⁄er from its steady state level during the stochastic period
of punishment following a detected deviation14. Therefore we will have to
consider both the exact punishment actions (over-investment in R&D) and
the requirement on expected future (after the end of the punishment period)
investment needed to make punishment worthwhile. Hence, we will need to
compute the counterparts of eq.s (23) and (26). This will be the main task
of the subsection.
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Therefore eq. (23) gives at all dates the value of country B punishers￿invest-
ment su¢ cient to dissuade the entry in sector ! by country A R&D ￿rms. I
will prove next that this threat will in turn be credible.
Given R&D investment (30), the corresponding Poisson process implies
that with probability one, at some ￿nite date there will be a new quality
14Notice that in all our equilibria, deviations are assumed to be detected after a sto-
chastically long period needed to observe their e⁄ect (innovation by the new leader), i.e.
only in case the deviator is successful in its R&D activity. This does not require more
information structure than usually assumed in quality ladders models, as Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom￿ s (1999) model.
24jump appropriated by country B￿ s R&D ￿rms. In order for punishers￿R&D
investment If(!;t) given by (30) to be part of a best response by country B
R&D ￿rms, each country B R&D investor shall not expect additional gains
or losses from investing in sector !, that is the usual R&D arbitrage condition
must hold for the further future R&D activity. Hence:
v(!;t) =
￿N(t)







for all t 2 R+ : j(!;t) ￿ j(!;t0) + 2.
This in turn implies a requirement on the expected future value of I(!;t)
after the following quality jump15 in sector !. Consistently, we set:











To sum up, this section has shown that the previously described asym-
metric equilibria do not entail any deviation from agent optimizing behavior
in their actions and in their beliefs.
It is interesting to note that the previous derivation did not hinge on sym-
metry. We could have heterogenous pro￿ts (￿(!)s) and di¢ culties (k(!)s)
and yet use the previous formulas. Viceversa, exploiting the structurally
symmetric fundamentals, we can view the same derivation in terms of value
functions:
1. At any instant ￿ > 0 after a ￿rst successful deviation from the equilib-
rium path in industry ! 2 ￿B the punishment of the country A￿ s deviator is
worth pursuing because the contingent future is rationally expected accord-
ing to eq. (32) - predicting I(!;s) = I(!00;s), !;!00 2 ￿B, for all s ￿ minft :
jmax(!;t) = jmax(!;￿) + 1g - and eq. (31), predicting v(!;s) = v(!00;s), for
all s ￿ minft : jmax(!;t) = jmax(!;￿) + 1g.
2. At any instant ￿ > 0 after a ￿rst successful deviation from the equi-
librium path in industry ! 2 ￿B, ￿-parameterized punishment (30), though
harsh - If(!;￿) > I(!0;￿), !0 2 ￿A - is feasible because each sector￿ s R&D is
15As in the previous subsection, I have now dropped deponent f, to denote the obsoles-
cence expected for dates after the end of the punishment phase.
25a zero measure subset of the mass of active sectors ￿B and hence I(!;￿)
can be made arbitrarily larger without a⁄ecting total country B￿ s R&D R
!002￿B.I(!00;￿)d!00.
3. Expecting the just described response, at any instant ￿ ￿ 0 before a
￿rst successful deviation from the equilibrium path in industry ! 2 ￿B ￿rms
in country A always know that in case of their success in R&D in industry ! it
will follow: v(!;s) < v(!00;s), for all s ￿ minft : jmax(!;t) = jmax(!;￿)+1g.
3.6 Sunspot Equilibrium Interpretation
It is important to clarify that the equilibrium strategies used in this paper
are not those of a game of entry deterrence: they belong to a special case of
sunspot equilibrium.
In each perfectly competitive R&D market economic agents take the price
vector as given. Each ￿rm is assumed to be so small that changes or devi-
ations in its individual choices do not a⁄ect prices16. In the present paper,
one may puzzle by thinking that we have negligible and competitive R&D
￿rms that nonetheless expect that their individual choices a⁄ect the choices
of other negligible and competitive ￿rms. In particular, if they do R&D in
a ￿foreign sector￿they will be punished by foreign ￿rms. How could this
be? If the R&D market is competitive, the free-entry conditions are ￿ne
as stated but out-of-equilibrium beliefs should play no role in any argument
since R&D ￿rms take prices and length of monopoly power as given17. In
order to fully understand the multiple-equilibria argument in our competi-
tive R&D setting, the reader shall realize that in our stylized economy there
16In a Nash equilibrium individuals take the actions of other individuals as given. Each
individual is assumed to think that changes in his/her individual choices do not a⁄ect
the actions of other players. This seems a reasonable assumption for games with a large
number of players, but not for games with a small number of players. In the latter context,
it seems more reasonable to assume that individuals think that changes in their choices
will elicit changes in the choices of other agents. After all, individuals are large in the sense
that changes in their individual choices a⁄ect the environment faced by other agents. In
such a context, beliefs about what these further changes are become crucial and this is
exactly what concepts of equilibrium such as subgame perfection focus upon.
17If the R&D market were oligopolistic, then there might be a role for out-of equilibrium
beliefs in an argument but the free-entry conditions in the paper are no longer relevant,
which is not the market structure we have in mind. In fact it is not acceptable to assume
that ￿rms are in fact small and yet they believe to be large in the sense that their individual
choices elicit some response by other ￿rms.
26are two di⁄erent sets of prices, lengths of market power and international
allocations of R&D such that ￿rms maximize their values taking those prices
as given. Actually, the previous sections have shown that there are two dif-
ferent sets of prices, lengths of market power and international allocations of
R&D such that ￿rms maximize their values assuming that other ￿rms react
in some speci￿c way to changes in the national primacy in a sub-set of sec-
tors. Without complicating notation even more, let us just notice that we
could de￿ne a continuous time sunspot variable, ￿(!;t), "nationality at time
t ￿ 0 of the patent holder in any sector ! 2 [0;1]" that take on values A and
B. Strategies would be contingent on the realisations of ￿(￿;t), prescribing
that the mass of R&D ￿rms in countries A and B react di⁄erently to each
f￿(!;t)g!2[0;1] according to their equilibrium decision rules.
Unlike in a game of entry deterrence, here the R&D ￿rms of each country
only react to a public signal: the nationality of the patent race winner in any
given sector. This public signal is distributed according to a Poisson process
whose intensity depends on the R&D expenditures in each sector. If a coun-
try A ￿rm undertakes positive R&D in a sector ! 2 ￿B it may even alter the
probability distribution of the !￿ s component of the sunspot variable by a
vanishing small amount. However, its victory in the patent race - which will
occur randomly - would be associated with a change in the value of the pub-
lic signal that would trigger R&D ￿rms B￿ s disproportionate investment in
sector !. Country B R&D ￿rms are equally better o⁄"overinvesting" in sec-
tor ! because the R&D arbitrage condition equalizes their expected returns
accross sectors. Therefore any country A ￿rm, when undertaking R&D in
sector ! 2 ￿B is buying an asset whose returns are perfectly correlated with
the o⁄-equilibrium-path sunspot signal. Therefore the value of the amount it
will expect to gain in case it is successful is the value of the patent associated
with high country B R&D investment.
To sum up, the potentially deviating country A R&D ￿rm would not ￿nd
it convenient to undertake R&D in sector ! 2 ￿B not because it expects to
alter substantially18 the probability of triggering a punishment, but because
it expects to be trying to appropriate a patent whose value is the stock
market price of a new monopoly facing an abnormally ￿erce patent race in
sector ! 2 ￿B. The prospective "punishers" only respond to a public signal
incorporating sunspot value ￿(!;t) = A. Hence, R&D ￿rm A￿ s success is
18There may be more ￿rms attempting to deviate from the equilibrium and the chance
of each of them of winning the race can be negligible anyway.
27associated with public signal - sunspot value - ￿(!;t) = A, which imposes
low patent values in sector !.
Atomless R&D industries consist of a density of competitive ￿rms which
take sunspot contingent prices as given and formulate sunspot contingent
strategies. The probability of sunspot variables taking on di⁄erent values
in this model are endogenous and depend on the national composition of
the mass of R&D expenditures undertaken by the zero measure R&D ￿rms
in perfectly competitive R&D industries. From the de￿nition of atomless
industries, each single country A R&D ￿rm investing in a sector ! 2 ￿B
at time t cannot modify the probability of ￿(!;t0) = A for any t0 ￿ t, nor
can it modify the industry￿ s probability intensity of the next innovation -
determined by the total mass of country B￿ s R&D ￿rms in the industry.
It only determines the amount of state contingent patent values it buys,
but neither their price nor the probability of the events on which payo⁄ is
contingent.
4 Intuition and Implications
The economic intuition for Proposition 1 and 2 is simple. Due to discriminat-
ing social norms country A￿ s R&D specializes in a larger number of sectors
than country B￿ s. Human capital will be larger in country A because pro￿ts
are equalized worldwide due to the presence of multinational manufacturing
￿rms and interest rates are the same: therefore perfect competition in the
R&D sector requires a higher skilled wage in order to compensate for the
lower obsolescence per-sector. Higher country A￿ s skill premium does not
su¢ ce to equalize obsolescence rates because the average ability of the re-
searchers lowers as more people are induced to educate themselves. In the
long run TEG speci￿cation of technology implies that the di¢ culty index
grows less for products invented in country A. Under PEG speci￿cation the
di¢ culty index remains the same. In both cases the average quality of the
R&D workers in country A remains lower than in country B, but their in-
creased mass su¢ ces to produce a larger aggregate ￿ ow of innovations per
unit time. Higher functional inequality in country A may seem responsible
for the larger proportion of educated population and for the better innovative
performance, however the ultimate source of cross country di⁄erences is the
di⁄erent range of sectors targeted by R&D.
28As common in quality ladders models, the free entry condition into re-
search in each industry implies R&D investors￿indi⁄erence across sectors,
and therefore it does not su¢ ce to determine the overall level of investment
in research that will occur. Given that expected pro￿ts return to normal
for the domestic ￿rms after they have punished a foreign entrant, it is ratio-
nal for the domestic ￿rms to ￿over-invest￿in R&D during the punishment
phase. Nothing in the model requires higher returns during the punishing
phase, so the reader can immediately see what would justify higher levels of
domestic investment in R&D at that time. Notice that social norms exempt
the government from providing economic incentives to the ￿rms to undertake
additional R&D: this kind of social norms can be described as rational.
Asymmetric international specialization in innovation could be interpreted
as exogenous with no change in our formal results. Hence this paper￿ s conclu-
sions do not necessarily depend on the indeterminacy of equilibria. However
it has shown that this cause of cross-country growth performance and income
inequality could be generated by self-enforcing social norms whose possibility
is disclosed by the perfect functioning of R&D and capital markets. As in
every case of multiplicity of equilibria the natural interpretation is the ne-
cessity to look also at extra-economic factors to completely explain diverging
economic performances. Hence what is emphasized is the possibility that
in a Schumpeterian world variables publicly a⁄ecting market psychology -
mass media science and technology histories, R&D promotion declarations,
organizations￿cultures and rituals, geopolitical debates, etc. - may induce
economic agents to coordinate their expectations on a particular equilibrium
thereby having real e⁄ects.
It is natural for the reader to wonder if the symmetric steady state has
some additional virtues that make it more likely to be obtained. In particular
it would be desirable to have a complete transitional dynamics analysis. Un-
fortunately, as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) remark, out of the steady
state the model would be ￿ intractable￿ . However, the structure of the model
allows a brief heuristic discussion of the stability of each steady state char-
acterized in the previous sections. For example, let us imagine that after
having been following the symmetric steady state expectations unexpectedly
changed in the way consistent with one of our asymmetric steady states.
Given the existing equal levels of human capital in both countries, coun-
try A will dilute it over a larger mass of sectors than country B. Given
the same level of the di¢ culty indexes in all sectors and in both countries,
the demand for skilled labor will increase in country A and it will decrease
29in country B. Given the assumed schooling technology the human capital
levels will remain constant for a period of length T implying that the real
wage of human capital will increase in country A and decrease in country
B, whereas of course unskilled wage will remain equal due to the presence
of multinational ￿nal good ￿rms in each sector. Responding to the wage
premium incentives more people of lower ability to learn will gradually start
educating themselves in country A whereas fewer people in country B will
get skilled. After T time units the human capital level will start increasing
in country A and decreasing in country B, thereby pushing real wages in the
opposite directions, though not to their original values (associated with the
initial stocks of human capital).
Hence, intuitively, we expect inequality in country A to increase ￿rst and
then to partially decrease, and the reverse to occur in country B. Country
A￿ s larger number of active R&D sectors implies fewer people undertaking
R&D. In the PEG speci￿cation of technology we expect this process to be
continuing pushing the system in the direction of the new steady state.
Under the TEG speci￿cation an additional set of state variables should be
considered. In fact, in country A the dynamic decreasing returns to R&D will
set in at a lower speed relative to population growth, and hence population-
adjusted complexity indexes will be increasing at a lower speed than in every
research line active in country B 19. In turn less complexity of R&D in
country A continues to spur R&D and education. Higher R&D employment
in country A than in country B seems therefore likely both in the medium
and in the long run. Lower complexity also will tend to allow a smaller mass
of human capital per sector to carry out the same number of inventions as do
the more concentrated research mass in country B. Finally, the long run per-
capita innovation rates in each country will tend to be proportional to the
number of active industries, because of TEG. However due to the ine¢ cient
allocation of human capital across countries the per-capita level of technology
worldwide - indexed by xAm(￿A) + xBm(￿B) - will be asymptotically lower
than in the symmetric steady state.
Our main results do not strictly hinge on Dinopoulos and Segerstrom￿ s
(1999) assumption of endogenous skill formation. If we made the assumption
that the endowments of skilled and unskilled labor were independent of the
19In fact, solving di⁄erential equation (TEG) implies that X
N !
￿s
N0, where s is the share
- constant in the steady state - of the labor force that gets skilled. Therefore a higher
s implies no e⁄ect on the growth rate of the population-adjusted di¢ culty index but a
positive level e⁄ect on its steady state amount.
30relative wage of skilled labor the skill premium would likely remain higher in
country A, as there would be no variation in the proportion of the population
that gets skilled. The di⁄erent ratios of human capital per-sector would
a⁄ect the international skilled wage di⁄erentials and - in the TEG case - the
complexity indexes evolution.
If labor was imperfectly mobile, the main results of endogenous asym-
metric speciation would still hold. In particular, at however small migration
cost, the unskilled labor would not migrate because the unskilled wage is the
same in both countries due to the presence of multinationals. Instead, the
di⁄erent skill premium would induce some country B workers to migrate to
country A, until the current value of the di⁄erential wage ￿ ow is equal to the
migration cost. As a consequence, despite a lower cross-country di⁄erence in
the skill premium, country A￿ s larger fraction of the labor force that is skilled
would be even larger, with ampli￿ed consequences on the innovation rates
and the di¢ culty indexes. Scenarios with lower mobility frictions would lead
us to asymmetric equilibria in which the wage inequality asymmetries are
weaker and quantity asymmetries are stronger, whereas the ine¢ cient use of
human capital would be less sever.
A few theoretical considerations are in order. In this paper I have used
the word "sunspot" equilibria to refer to public signals that trigger the "pun-
ishing" behavior by R&D investors depending on the nationality of the inno-
vators. Like in a correlated equilibrium (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 252), the
strategies of the agents prescribe actions as functions of a common public
signal. Notice that, though this economy admits more Nash equilibria, the
sunspot is not used to coordinate agents to a particular equilibrium: in each
equilibrium the sunspot basically ￿signals￿to all agents what other agents
shall do. Like in a game of entry deterrence, out-of-equilibrium beliefs on
￿punishments￿are crucial to the argument, but in our general equilibrium
framework with perfectly competitive R&D the punishment is not necessar-
ily carried out by the challenged incumbent, but by a multitude of other
domestic R&D investors whose actions are taken after observing the realiza-
tion of the public signal. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs play an important role in
the functioning of each sunspot equilibrium, because they contemplate the
expectation that the sunspot will signal to all R&D investors the loss of an
innovative sector and the time to invest more intensively there. The range of
sectors on which the agents believe the public signal - i.e. the sunspot - will
trigger the punishers￿response to a deviation di⁄ers in each of our equilibria.
For this reason, what we have here is a multiplicity of sunspot equilibria.
315 Final Remarks
This paper has shown that in a Schumpeterian world though national innova-
tive performance and international trade may seem to be correlated with both
technologies and endowments a major role can be played by social norms that
are consistent with perfectly rational individualistic behavior. According to
this theoretical approach, national systems of innovations can be interpreted
as collective coordination devises of large masses of economic resources -
such as labor and savings - on the enforcement of an equilibrium in which
countries acquire persistent technological excellence in particular industries.
The role of policies as coordination devices - ￿ sunspots￿- is emphasized in
a technologically competitive international environment.
This paper does not deny realistic path dependence a⁄ecting fundamen-
tal variables such as ￿rm-speci￿c tacit knowledge, corporate technological
trajectories, etc. However, it emphasizes that in a world where ideas are
increasingly codi￿ed and communicated, the education industry is increas-
ingly standardized to the best practices available, and goods and capital are
increasingly mobile, a fundamental role of the international constellation of
the national actors of innovations may be strategic.
Propositions 1 and 2 proved that in our stylized two-country world econ-
omy there exist a continuum of steady states in which one country (country
A) maintains a leadership in a larger set of ￿nal products and has a more
educated labor force than the other country (country B). This kind of in-
determinacy di⁄ers from Benhabib and Perli (1994) and related literature
(see Benhabib and Farmer 1999 for a review) because it hinges on the basic
insight of Schumpeterian ￿ creative destruction￿ : the similarity between the
forward looking character of R&D and that of the overlapping generation
models with money (as Samuelson 1958 and Shell 1971).
It is worthwhile to remark that, as shown in section 3.1.1, our sunspot
equilibria do not dictate that countries cannot simultaneously carry out R&D
in the same industries, but only that countries do not carry out R&D exactly
in the same number of industries. If countries or continents di⁄er - no matter
how little - in the number of sectors in which they innovate our qualitative
analysis applies. To keep the results more transparent I have focussed on the
extreme case of full specialization.
Moreover, though we concentrated on steady states, our analysis does
not imply that from time to time countries cannot change their social norms.
32For example, the government and the media in the US in the ￿ 80s and in
the 90s signalled a major intention to gain competitive supremacy in the
high technology sectors, thereby implicitly or explicitly stimulating a surge
in private R&D, not matched by a similar increase in public R&D expendi-
tures. Along with other factors, I suggest that also a change in social norms
may have a⁄ected the real economy. The simultaneous increase in the skill
premium and in education attainments seem to give indirect support to this
interpretation.
A few decades earlier, the role of nationally oriented social norms in the
break of US and European supremacy in the car industry by the ￿rms of
Japan and Korean20 can have been non-negligible.
Somewhat similarly, the recent European enthusiasm for the advent of
the euro and the attempts to coordinate e⁄orts at the continental level may
improve the interpretation of some recent high technology successes by the
old continent: for example, twenty years ago, the civil aviation industry was
dominated by the US ￿rms, while the now leader Airbus was an industry
disaster.21.
To summarize the consequences of the self-ful￿lling international divi-
sion of innovation, let us remind that in every asymmetric steady state the
more R&D diversi￿ed country, A, is characterized by a larger fraction of
the population employed in the R&D sector, more wage inequality, same
manufacturing pro￿ts, better stock market performance of its manufacturing
￿rms22, same unskilled labor wage and a larger set of industries that are
undertaking R&D.
These characteristics do not depend on the e⁄ect of growth on the com-
plexity of R&D. Hence both TEG and PEG yield the same predictions for
the variables described above. However their predictions diverge in the fol-
20Where there were virtually no domestically made cars until after the Korean war.
21This is an example where governments provided huge subsidies and so does not really
follow our example of a pure coordination issue. It is a case where both countries decided
to defend that particular industry, by mobilizing both private and public R&D resources.
However, it has been quoted to emphasize an e⁄ect of the old continent￿ s equilibrium
change - in the direction of a more European oriented social norm - on an industrial sector
at least partially consistent with the predictions of our model.
It is intriguing to note that, by introducing some degree of public R&D in our hypo-
thetical economy, as well as the presence of overlapping sectors (the non-partition case),
it would in principle be possible to explicitly account for such a case.
22Due to lower sectoral obsolescence, permanent in the PEG case and at least temporary
in the TEG case.
33lowing aspects of the asymmetric steady state. Under the TEG speci￿cation,
per-capita innovation rate is higher in country A, per sector innovation rate
is the same in both countries, and R&D is less di¢ cult in country A and
hence its fewer R&D workers per sector are more productive. Under the
PEG speci￿cation, per-capita innovation rate is higher in country A, per sec-
tor innovation rate is higher in country B, R&D is equally di¢ cult in both
countries.
Therefore both speci￿cations predict that more industrial diversi￿cation
generates a higher skill premium, more educated workers, less intense but
more spread R&D, more per-capita innovation and growth in the long run.
Hence both predict a positive cross country relationship between education
and growth (as in Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995) and a positive cross-country
correlation between inequality and growth (as found by Forbes 2000).
According to TEG, the world steady state utility growth rate does not
depend on the distribution of education and R&D activities across countries,
but there is a negative worldwide level e⁄ect of the asymmetry. PEG pre-
dicts that as a result of a self-ful￿lling inter-country inequality (asymmetry)
the country with the higher inequality is innovating more than the more
equal country, but the growth rate of individual utility worldwide is strictly
lower than in the symmetric equilibrium. Hence, this paper suggests some
care in interpreting a positive cross-country inequality-growth relationship as
an indicator that inequality is good for growth: the consideration of endoge-
nous inter- and intra-country inequality can reverse the judgement from mere
cross-country data. Therefore this theoretical exercise has identi￿ed at the
same time a new source of potential ine¢ ciency in a Schumpeterian world
economy and a new negative relationship between inequality and growth.
Our assumption of immobile labor certainly played a role in the derivation
of international wage di⁄erentials. It would be interesting to link the channel
highlighted by this paper with the new economic geographical models on (at
least) this important aspect. However, considering imperfectly mobile skilled
workers would probably reinforce the asymmetric result, but certainly not the
decisive ￿ divergence￿force. Indeed, in the US case for example, there has
been a deteriorating skill composition of the immigrants ￿ ow. Roughly the
same skill composition as the native workers in the 1970s, and a signi￿cantly
higher mean educational attainment for the latter in 1990: 13.2 versus 11.6
years (Borjas, 1994).
In a sense our e¢ cient or ine¢ cient use of human capital argument de-
pends on the number of high ability individuals in a country, so some notion
34of scale does appear to matter here. The worldwide equilibrium conditions
imply that domestic R&D be large enough. If scale were completely irrel-
evant then it would seem that within individual European countries there
be greater cohesion than within the US. Only when looking at Europe as a
whole would this argument for less cohesion seem relevant. So our choice of
comparing the US to Europe rather than the US to Germany is important.
It would be interesting to extend this theory to the case of heterogeneously
sized countries.
6 Appendix





0 , xA, and xB. Solving the two equations in (15) for xA, and xB,






































(1 + CA) + ￿
A
0 ￿ (1 + 2CA) + CA(1 ￿ 2￿),
where CK ￿
￿ (￿ + n=￿ ￿ n)￿￿
2(￿ ￿ 1)m(￿K)n
, K = A;B.
Since the right hand side of the ￿rst eq. (33) is a strictly concave quadratic
polynomial with roots ￿(1 ￿ 2￿) and 1, there exists one and only one real
and positive solution ￿
B
0 2 (￿;1) for each value of ￿
A







. Since the right hand side of the second eq. (33) is a strictly
concave quadratic with two roots, one negative and one larger than ￿ but
less than 1, it follows that there exists one and only one real and positive
solution ￿
A
0 2 (￿;1) for each value of ￿
B

































by Brouwer￿ s theorem, which
is in the interior of [￿;1]2, as seen by direct substitution. Plugging this into
(15) and solving for xK gives the steady state vector ￿
A
0 2 (￿;1), ￿
B
0 2 (￿;1),
35xA 2 R++, xB 2 R++. This derivation can be repeated for each partition of
measures m(￿K), K = A;B.
The comparative statics properties of such solutions are those mentioned
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would imply xA < xB- because m(￿A) > m(￿B) - which is a contradiction.
Hence properties a, b and c follow. Point d holds because the growth rate
is (m(￿A)n=￿ + m(￿B)n=￿)log￿ = (n=￿)log￿ as in the symmetric steady
state. For point e notice that in any of the two symmetric steady states (our
case of m(￿A) = m(￿B) = 1=2 and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom￿ s case with




0 ￿ e ￿0 are the same, as immediately seen by
direct substitution, after remembering to replace bxKm(￿K)n=2￿ for the right
sides of eq. (15). Instead in all steady states in which m(￿A) = 1￿m(￿B) >
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c = 2h(e ￿0).
where in the second inequality we have used ￿
B
0 < 2e ￿0 ￿ ￿
A
0 and in the third










0 ) < 2hH(e ￿0)
36is a direct consequence of the strict concavity of the sum of the left sides of
eq. (15). Q.E.D.































+ ￿ ￿ n
#
, K = A;B.
(34)
The right sides of (34) are strictly concave quadratic functions with one root
smaller than ￿ and one larger than 1. Hence the existence of a positive so-
lution vector ￿
A
0 2 (￿;1), ￿
B
0 2 (￿;1), IA 2 R++, IB 2 R++ for all partitions
of measures m(￿K), K = A;B is guaranteed by Brouwer￿ s theorem if the
left sides of (34) are smaller than the value of their corresponding right sides
when ￿
K
0 = 1 and ￿
K
0 = ￿. Since the left sides of (34) are strictly increas-
ing functions of ￿
K
0 and the right hand sides are decreasing uniqueness is
guaranteed too. The comparative statics properties of each steady state are
















0 this would imply IA < IB - because m(￿A) > m(￿B)
- which is a contradiction. Hence the stated properties a and b follow In
particular, eq. (2) is used to derive our results about wages.
For point c notice that in any of the two symmetric steady states (our
case of m(￿A) = m(￿B) = 1=2 and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom￿ s case with




0 ￿ e ￿0 are the same, as immediately seen by
direct substitution, after remembering to replace IK for IA +IB in the right
sides of eq. (16). Instead in all steady states in which m(￿A) = 1￿m(￿B) >
1=2 the total stock of human capital per-capita in our two country world is
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cm(￿B) ￿ 2e ￿0￿ ￿ d
￿ 2e ￿0
￿
e ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿
c ￿ d = 2h(e ￿0).
where in the second inequality we have used ￿
B
0 < 2e ￿0 ￿ ￿
A









0 ) < 2h(e ￿0)
is a direct consequence of the strict concavity of the sum of the left sides of
eq. (17). Q.E.D.
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